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Secure two-party cryptography is possible if the adversary’s quantum storage device suffers imperfections.
For example, security can be achieved if the adversary can store strictly less then half of the qubits transmitted
during the protocol. This special case is known as the bounded-storage model, and it has long been an open
question whether security can still be achieved if the adversary’s storage were any larger. Here, we answer this
question positively and demonstrate a two-party protocol which is secure as long as the adversary cannot store
even a small fraction of the transmitted pulses. We also show that security can be extended to a larger class of
noisy quantum memories.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two-party cryptography enables Alice and Bob to solve
problems in cooperation even if they do not trust each other.
Important examples of such tasks include auctions and secure
identification. In the latter, Alice wants to identify herself to
Bob (possibly a fraudulent automatic teller machine, ATM)
without revealing her password.
More generally, Alice and Bob wish to solve problems
where Alice holds an input x (e.g., her password) and Bob
holds an input y (e.g., the password an honest Alice should
possess), and they want to obtain the value of some function
f (x,y) (e.g., “yes” if x = y, and “no” otherwise), as depicted
in Fig. 1. Security means that Alice should not learn anything
about y and Bob should not learn anything about x, apart from
what can be inferred from f (x,y) [1].
Contrary to quantum key distribution where honest Alice
and Bob can work together to detect the presence of an outside
eavesdropper [2,3], two-party cryptography is made difficult
by the fact that Alice and Bob do not trust each other and
have to fend for themselves. Indeed, two-party cryptography
is impossible without making assumptions about the adversary,
even when we allow quantum communication [4]. The security
of most cryptographic systems in use today is based on
the premise that certain computational problems are hard
to solve for the adversary. Concretely, security relies on the
assumption that the adversary’s computational resources are
limited, and the underlying problem is hard in some precise
complexity-theoretic sense. While the former assumption may
be justified in practice, the latter statement is usually an
unproven mathematical conjecture.
It is thus a natural question whether other, more physical
assumptions regarding the two parties’ resources allow us to
obtain security without relying on any additional hardness
results. This is indeed known to be possible if we assume that
the adversary’s classical [5–7] or quantum storage is limited
[8–10] or more generally if his memory is simply imperfect
[11–13].
Concretely, the assumption of the noisy-storage model
entails that during waiting timest in a protocol, the adversary
has to measure or discard all his quantum information except
what he can encode (arbitrarily) into his quantum memory.
Any quantum storage can be modeled as a completely
positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map F : B(Hin) → B(Hout)
that maps states ρ ∈ Hin to some noisy states F(ρ) ∈ Hout. In
this paper, we focus on the case where the input space is an
n-fold tensor product Hin ∼= (Cd )⊗νn, the protocols involve
n-qudits of communication, and the noise is of the form
F ≡ N⊗νn with N : B(Cd ) → B(Cd ). The constant ν > 0
is referred to as the storage rate as it captures the fraction of
the transmitted qudits that could could potentially be stored
by the adversary.
Clearly, the storage rate ν plays a crucial role in deciding
whether security can be obtained from a particular storage
device. For example, in the case of bounded storage where we
have no noise (N = I), we can never hope to obtain security if
the adversary can store all quantum information made available
to him during the protocol, that is, if ν = 1 and the input space
isHin = (Cd )⊗n. Apart from this trivial condition, however, no
bounds were known that restrict our ability to obtain security.
In [9], it was shown that security can be achieved in a protocol
based on qubits (d = 2) as long as ν < 1/4. This was improved
to ν < 1/2 in [13]. More generally, it was shown that security
in the noisy-storage model can be obtained [13] if
CN ν < 12 , (1)
where CN is the classical capacity of the quantum channelN .
A. Results
Here, we show that for the case of bounded storage, security
can be obtained if the cheating party can store all but a constant
fraction of the transmitted pulses. That is, the trivial condition
ν < 1 stated previously is in fact optimal! The honest players
thereby need no quantum storage at all in order to execute the
protocol. This not only settles the question but also highlights
the sharp contrast to the case of classical bounded storage,
where it was shown that security can only be obtained if the
adversary’s classical storage is at most quadratic in the storage
required by the honest players [14]. Unlike the protocols
in [8,9,11,13], which use the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84)
protocol encoded qubits [2], we make use of states encoded
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FIG. 1. Secure identification.
in higher dimensional mutually unbiased bases.1 Of course,
we also scale the storage size accordingly to Hin = (Cd )⊗νn
when sending d dimensional states. More specifically, we show
that security in the setting of bounded storage is possible as
long as
ν <
log2(d + 1) − 1
log2 d
→ 1, (2)
where the right-hand side approaches 1 for large d. We stress
that for large values of d, the resulting protocols will be
much harder to implement experimentally, and even though
the errors decrease exponentially with n, they converge very
slowly for large d. Note, however, that here we are merely
interested in exploring the fundamental physical limitations of
this model.
For the general setting of noisy quantum storage, we further
show that security is possible for devices F = N⊗νn, where
the channelN : B(Cd ) → B(Cd ) satisfies the strong converse
property [15], whenever
CN ν < log2(d + 1) − 1, (3)
thus extending the range of storage devices for which we can
prove security [13]. Our proof thereby relies on an uncertainty
relation for mutually unbiased bases but is completely general
in the sense that any other set of encodings satisfying such a
relation could be used in our protocol instead.
We emphasize that that the setting considered here differs
greatly from quantum key distribution (QKD) [2,3], where
higher dimensional states have also been used to some
advantage. In QKD, Alice and Bob trust each other but are
trying to protect themselves from an outside eavesdropper. An
important advantage gained by Alice and Bob in this setting
is that they can work together to try and detect interference
by such an eavesdropper. In contrast, in the scenario we are
considering there is no analogous way for Alice to check
on any of Bob’s actions, and vice versa. Hence, we require
an entirely different proof of security as used in QKD, and
whereas results from QKD may provide some clues, they give
very little indication that higher dimensional states are useful
for our problem.
B. Techniques
We first give an overview of the steps involved in obtaining
our result. The constant 1/2 in the bound (1) is a result of using
1Two orthonormal bases B1 = {|x(1)〉 | x ∈ {0, . . . ,d − 1}} and
B2 = {|x(2)〉 | x ∈ {0, . . . ,d − 1}} are called mutually unbiased if for
all x,y ∈ {0, . . . ,d − 1} we have |〈x(1)|y(2)〉| = 1/√d.
BB84 protocol states [2] in the protocol and stems from an
uncertainty relation for measurements in these two bases [16].
It is thus natural to consider a protocol that uses more than
two mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) for which uncertainty
relations are known to exist [17]. Our first step is to obtain
a modified protocol for the simple two-party primitive weak
string erasure, which was originally introduced in [13], using
the full set of d + 1 MUBs that are known to exist in prime
power dimensions [18,19]. Next, we show that there is still
a secure protocol for the cryptographic primitive of oblivious
transfer using this variant of weak string erasure (WSE). This
is done by purely classical postprocessing of the output of
the quantum primitive weak string erasure. Since it is known
that any two-party cryptographic problem can be solved using
oblivious transfer [20], this concludes our claim.
II. WEAK STRING ERASURE
We first show how to obtain a variant of the very simple
cryptographic primitive WSE introduced in [13], which we
call nonuniform WSE; A formal definition can be found in
Appendix A. Intuitively, this primitive provides Alice with
a string Xn = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ {0,1, . . . ,d − 1}n, where each
entry Xi takes on one of d possible values. Bob obtains a
set of index locations I = {i1, . . . ,i|I| | ij ∈ [n]}, where any
index i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} =: [n] is chosen to be in I with some
probability p. In addition, Bob receives the entries of the
string Xn corresponding to the indices I, which we denote by
the substring XI = (Xi1 ,Xi2 , . . . ,Xi|I| ). Security here means
that even if Alice is dishonest, she cannot learn which entries
are known to Bob; that is, she cannot learn anything about
the index set I. Conversely, if Bob is dishonest, then his
information about the entire string Xn should still be limited
in the sense that the probability that he can guess all of Xn
given his information B ′ is small. That is,
Pguess(X|B ′)  2−λn (4)
for some λ > 0. This is equivalent [21] to demanding that his
min-entropy [22] denoted as H∞(Xn|B ′)ρ obeys
H∞(Xn|B ′)ρ = − log2 Pguess(Xn|B ′)  λn. (5)
In practice, we allow this condition to fail with error parameter
ε, which corresponds to demanding that the smooth min-
entropy defined as
Hε∞(Xn|B ′)ρ := sup
ρ¯XnB′0
1
2 ‖ρ¯XnB′−ρXnB′ ‖1tr(ρXnB′ )ε
tr(ρ¯XnB′ )tr(ρXnB′ )
H∞(Xn|B ′)ρ¯ (6)
satisfies
Hε∞(Xn|B ′)  λn. (7)
A. Protocol
Next, we outline a simple protocol that achieves the
functionality previously described. It is a straightforward
generalization of the original protocol in [13] to multiple
encodings, the main difference being that the indices in
I ⊆ [n] are no longer chosen uniformly at random. Instead,
the probability p that honest Bob learns the value of Xi for
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i ∈ [n] is equal to the probability that he chooses the same
basis as Alice, that is, p = 1/(d + 1). In what follows, let 2[n]
denote the set of all subsets of [n].
Protocol 1: Nonuniform WSE. Outputs are xn ∈
{0,1, . . . ,d − 1}n to Alice and (I,z|I|) ∈ 2[n] × {0,1, . . . ,d −
1}|I| to Bob.
(1) Alice. Picks an n-dit string uniformly at random, xn ∈
{0,1, . . . ,d − 1}n. She encodes each dit into one of the d + 1
MUBs; Bθ1 , . . . ,Bθn that is, she chooses a basis string θn =
(θ1, . . . ,θn) ∈ {0, . . . ,d}n uniformly at random, so that the dit
xj is encoded in basis Bθj , and sends it to Bob.
(2) Bob. Chooses a basis string ˜θn ∈ {0,1, . . . ,d}n uni-
formly at random. When receiving the ith qudit, he measures
it in the basis B ˜θi to obtain outcome x˜i .
Both parties wait time t .
(3) Alice. Sends the basis information θn to Bob and
outputs xn.
(4) Bob. Computes I := {i ∈ [n]|θi = ˜θi} and outputs
(I,x˜I ).
We now formally state our claim that this protocol does
indeed implement nonuniform WSE, with the parameters ε, λ,
and d.
Theorem 1. Let Bob’s storage be given by F = N⊗νn
with a storage rate ν > 0, where N satisfies the strong
converse property [15] and the capacity CN of the channel N
bounded by
CN ν < log2(d + 1) − 1 . (8)
Let δ ∈]0, 12 − CN ν[. Then, Protocol 1 securely implements
weak string erasure for sufficiently large n with
λ(δ,d) = νγN
(
log2(d + 1) − 1 − δ
ν
)
, (9)
and error ε(δ,d) = 2 exp[−f (δ,d)n] with
f (δ,d) ∝ −nδ2/{log2[(d + 1)d] + log2 4/δ}2 > 0, (10)
where γN (·) is the strong converse parameter of N [15].
Note that for bounded storage, where N is simply the
identity channel over Bob’s d-dimensional input Hilbert
space, CN = log2 d in (8), which directly implies our central
result (2).
It is easy to see that the protocol is correct if both parties
are honest: If Alice is honest, her string Xn = xn is chosen
uniformly at random from {0,1, . . . ,d − 1}n as desired, and if
Bob is honest, he clearly obtains x˜i = xi whenever i ∈ I for
a random subset I ⊆ [n]. In the remainder of this section, we
prove security if one of the parties is dishonest.
B. Security against dishonest Bob
First of all, we need to show that even if Bob is dishonest,
he can nevertheless not learn much about the entire string Xn.
In other words, our goal is to show that there exists some λ > 0
satisfying (7). Our proof proceeds in three steps; technical
details can be found in Appendix A. First, we consider Bob’s
information about the string Xn given only his classical
information K , and the basis information 	n he receives. This
can be quantified using entropic uncertainty relations in terms
of the Shannon entropy for d + 1 MUBs in Cd [17]. When
ν
BB84 based WSE
(d= 4 ,5)
Generalized WSE
(d= 4 ,5)
FIG. 2. (Color online) Security regions (r,ν) for weak string
erasure (WSE) with depolarizing noise N (ρ) = rρ + (1 − r)I/d ,
in dimensions d = 4,5. Previously [13], security was shown in the
regions below the dotted (black) curve for d = 4 and the dot-dashed
(green) curve for d = 5. Our analysis extends the security region to
the solid (blue) curve (d = 4) and the dashed (red) curve (d = 5)
respectively.
[23, Theorem 4.22] is used, these uncertainty relations
imply a bound on Bob’s information in terms of the smooth
min-entropy
Hε/2∞ (Xn|K	n)ρ 
(
log2(d + 1) − 1 −
δ
2
)
n, (11)
for any 0 < δ < 12 with ε = 2 exp [−f (δ,d)n], forf (δ,d)  0.
That is, the error decreases exponentially with n, as desired.
Note that instead of mutually unbiased bases, we could have
used any other form of encodings obeying such a strong
uncertainty relation.
Next we consider Bob’s information, when in addition he
is given the output of his storage device F(Q). We know
from [13] that the uncertainty relation (11) determines the rate
at which Bob needs to send information through his storage
device. Using [13, Lemma 2.2] together with (11), we obtain
Hε∞(Xn|	nKF(Q))ρ
 − log2 PFsucc
[
n
(
log2(d + 1) − 1 −
δ
2
)]
, (12)
where PFsucc(nR) is the average probability of sending a
randomly chosen string x ∈ {0,1}nR through the storage F .2
For noise of the form F = N⊗νn, the right-hand side of
(12) is the success probability of sending νn bits at a rate
R = [log2(d + 1) − 1 − δ/2]/ν. The final step is to note that
for channels satisfying the strong converse property [15], this
success probability drops off exponentially with n according to
2P Fsucc(nR) is given by P Fsucc(nR) = max{Mx }x ,{ρx }x 12nR∑
x∈{0,1}n tr (MxF(ρx)), where the maximization is taken over
encodings {ρx}x and decoding positive operator valued measures
(POVMs) {Mx}x .
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the parameter γN (·) whenever R > CN . This gives the bound
CN ν < log2(d + 1) − 1 −
δ
2
. (13)
Theorem 1 then follows by noting that exponential security (in
n) is possible for any constant δ > 0. As an example of how our
bound improves upon the earlier bound in [13], we compare
the corresponding security regions for WSE with depolarizing
noise, i.e. when N (ρ) = rρ + (1 − r)I/d, in Fig. 2.
C. Security against dishonest Alice
When Alice is dishonest, it is intuitively obvious that she is
unable to gain any information about the index set I, since she
never receives any information from Bob during our protocol.
However, a more careful security analysis is required if we
want to use WSE to build more complicated primitives such
as oblivious transfer. This argument is essentially analogous
to [13], as outlined in Appendix A for completeness.
III. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
Ultimately, we would like to use WSE to solve arbitrary
two-party cryptographic problems. To this end, it suffices to
implement the primitive oblivious transfer,3 which can solve
any two-party problem [20]. Informally, this primitive outputs
two strings S
0,S
1 ∈ {0,1}
 to Alice and a choice bit C ∈ {0,1}
and S
C to Bob. Security means that if Alice is dishonest, she
should not learn anything about C. If Bob is dishonest, we
demand that there exists some random variable C such that
Bob is entirely ignorant about S
1−C . That is, he may learn at
most one of the two strings which are generated.
Here, we state a simplified version of the actual protocol
which executes fully randomized oblivious transfer from WSE.
This is a purely classical protocol, using the quantum primitive
WSE. It contains all the essential ingredients to understand the
main steps of our security proof. A formal definition, as well
as the full protocol, can be found in Appendix B. The only
difference from the protocol presented in [13] is the fact that
I is no longer uniform, and honest Bob only learns about
pn entries xj , whereas in the case of uniform WSE [13] he
could learn roughly n/2. We hence introduce a new parameter
η = 2(d + 1) in the protocol, such that with high probability
Bob learns at least n/η of the indices.
Our protocol uses two ingredients, privacy amplification
and a primitive called interactive hashing, and we refer to [13]
for an overview of these techniques. Privacy amplification
is well known from its role in quantum key distribution [22].
Although interactive hashing is well known within the realm of
classical cryptography, it has only recently found applications
in quantum information [13]. Intuitively, an interactive hashing
protocol has the following properties: It takes as input a subset
Itr (encoded as a string w) from Bob and outputs two subsets
I0,I1 ∈ [n] (encoded as strings w0,w1) to both Alice and Bob.
The protocol ensures that there exists a c ∈ {0,1}, such that
Ic = Itr, that is, one of the two subsets it outputs is equal to
Bob’s original input. Note that since Bob knows his input,
3Here we execute fully randomized oblivious transfer [9,24] which
can easily be converted into standard 1–2 oblivious transfer [25,26].
he can of course compute c. Nevertheless, interactive hashing
ensures that Alice cannot learn which subset is the same as
Bob’s input; that is, Alice cannot learn c. Finally, interactive
hashing has another important property we will need: Whereas
Bob can choose one of these subsets (namely Ic), the choice
of the other subset is not under his control. In fact, I1−c is
essentially chosen at random.
Protocol 2: Oblivious Transfer. Outputs are (s
0,s
1) ∈{0,1}
 × {0,1}
 to Alice and (c,y
) ∈ {0,1} × {0,1}
 to Bob.
(1) Alice and Bob. Execute WSE. Alice gets a string xn ∈
{0,1, . . . ,d − 1}n, Bob gets a set I ⊂ [n] and a string s = xI .
If |I| < n/η, Bob chooses uniformly at random a set Itr of
size |Itr| = n/η. Otherwise, he randomly truncates I to |Itr|
of size n/η and deletes the corresponding values in s.
(2) Alice and Bob. Execute interactive hashing with Bob’s
input w equal to a description of Itr = Enc(w). Interpret the
outputs w0 and w1 as descriptions of subsets I0 and I1 of [n].
(3) Alice. Chooses r0,r1 ∈R R and sends them to Bob.
(4) Alice. Outputs (s
0,s
1) := [Ext(xI0 ,r0),Ext(xI1 ,r1)]
using Ext : {0, . . . ,d − 1}n/η ×R → {0,1}
, the two-
universal hash function known from quantum key
distribution [22].
(5) Bob. Computes c ∈ {0,1} with I = Ic and xI from s.
He outputs (c,y
) := [c,Ext(s,rc)].
We provide only an overview of our proof since it closely
follows the steps in [13]; details can be found in Appendix B.
To show that the protocol is correct, we first use Hoeffding’s
inequality [27] to show that except with exponentially small
probability exp(−2n/η), Bob learns a sufficient number of
indices to retrieve the desired string SC .
A. Security against dishonest Alice
To show that the protocol is secure against a cheating Alice,
we have to show that there is no way for her to learn C,
that is, which of the two strings is known to honest Bob. We
again provide an overview of our proof and defer the complete
technical details to Appendix B.
First of all, note that the properties of WSE ensure that a
dishonest Alice does not know which dits xI of xn are known
to Bob; that is, she is ignorant about the index set I. This is
similar to the proof in [13]. However, for our new protocol
we encounter an additional difficulty since we need even the
truncated set Itr to be uniform over subsets of size n/η, but
I is no longer distributed uniformly over 2[n]. Formally, the
probability of a given truncated set Itr can be written in terms
of the probability p( ¯A) that |I|  n/η, as follows:
p(Itr| ¯A) =
∑
I|I|n/η
p(I| ¯A)( |I|
n/η
) = 1
p( ¯A)
∑
I
p(I)( |I|
n/η
) , (14)
independent of the choice of truncation as desired. Here,
1/
( |I|
n/η
)
is the probability of choosing the particular subset
Itr from I and p(I| ¯A) is the conditional probability of a
set I, given that |I|  n/η. The final equality is simply
an application of Bayes’s rule, p( ¯A)p(I| ¯A) = p( ¯A|I)p(I).
Finally, the fact that Itr is uniform together with the properties
of interactive hashing [28] ensure that Alice cannot gain any
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information about which of the two subsets I0 and I1 of bits
are known to Bob. Hence, she cannot learn C as desired.
B. Security against dishonest Bob
Again, it follows from WSE that a dishonest Bob gains
only a limited amount of information about the string Xn. The
properties of interactive hashing ensure that Bob has very little
control over the subset I1−c chosen by the interactive hashing.
Therefore, by the results on min-entropy sampling [29], Bob
has only limited information about the dits in this subset.
Privacy amplification [22,30] can then be used to turn this into
almost complete ignorance.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown that any two-party cryptographic primitive
can be implemented securely in the setting of bounded
quantum storage, even if the adversary can store all but a
fraction of the transmitted pulses. This is optimal, in the sense
that we could never hope to achieve security if the cheating
party could store all quantum communication made available
to him. This demonstrates that there is no physical principle
that prevents us from achieving security even with a very high
storage rate ν < 1. We have also shown in the noisy-storage
setting that security is possible for a much larger range of noisy
quantum memories.
To achieve our result, we use higher dimensional states
which are very difficult to create in practice. It is therefore
an interesting open question whether the same result could be
obtained using merely BB84 protocol encoded qubits. Note,
however, that our approach merely relies on the existence
of entropic uncertainty relations for multiple encodings, and
our protocols and proofs are completely analogous if we
were to use any other encodings for which strong uncertainty
relations are known to exist. For example, it is conceivable
that uncertainty relations for multiple encodings can be based
on top of BB84 protocol encoded qubits [31], which would
immediately lead to a protocol that is easy to implement
experimentally.
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APPENDIX A: WEAK STRING ERASURE
To formally state our result, let us first define nonuniform
weak string erasure (WSE). This definition closely follows the
one of [13], except that the string Xn is now chosen from
a larger alphabet and the indices in I ⊆ [n] are not chosen
uniformly at random. Instead, the probability p that honest
Bob learns the value of Xi for i ∈ [n] is equal to the probability
that he chooses the same basis as Alice, that is, p = 1/(d + 1).
In the following definition, we need to talk about distributions
over subsets I ⊆ [n]. Clearly, the probability that Bob learns
a particular subset I satisfies
Pr(I) = p|I|(1 − p)n−|I|. (A1)
Note that we can write the subset I as a string (y1, . . . ,yn) ∈
{0,1}n where yi = 1 if and only if i ∈ I, allowing us to
identify |I〉 := |y1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |yn〉. The probability distribution
over subsets I ⊆ [n] can then be expressed as (see also [13])
(p) :=
∑
I⊆2[n]
p|I|(1 − p)n−|I||I〉〈I|. (A2)
Furthermore, we follow the notation of [13] and use
τS := 1|S|
∑
s∈S
|s〉〈s| (A3)
to denote the uniform distribution over a set S.
Definition 1 (Nonuniform WSE). An [n,λ,ε,p,d]-WSE is a
protocol between A and B satisfying the following properties.
Correctness. If both parties are honest, then there exists
an ideal state σXnIXI defined such that
(1) The joint distribution of the n-dit string Xn and subset
I is given by
σXnI = τ{0,1,...,d−1}n ⊗ (p). (A4)
(2) The joint state ρAB created by the real protocol is equal
to the ideal state ρAB = σXnIXI where we identify (A,B) with
(Xn,IXI ).
Security for Alice. If A is honest, then there exists an ideal
state σXnB ′ such that
(1) The amount of information B ′ gives Bob about Xn is
limited:
1
n
H∞(Xn|B ′)σ  λ. (A5)
(2) The joint stateρAB ′ created by the real protocol is ε-close
to the ideal state, that is, σXnB ′ ≈ε ρAB ′ , where we identify
(Xn,B ′) with (A,B ′).
Security for Bob. If B is honest, then there exists ideal state
σA′ ˆXnI where ˆXn ∈ {0,1, . . . ,d − 1}n and I ⊆ [n] such that
(1) The random variable I is independent of A′ ˆXn and
distributed over 2[n] according to the probability distribution
given by (A1):
σA′ ˆXnI = σA′ ˆXn ⊗ (p). (A6)
(2) The joint state ρA′B created by the real protocol is equal
to the ideal state: ρA′B = σA′(I ˆXI ), where we identify (A′,B)
with (A′,I ˆXI ).
We are now ready to state our result for nonuniform WSE
more formally. We first state the general result for quantum
memories and then focus on the tensor-product channels of
the type F = N⊗νn.
Theorem 2. (i) Let δ ∈]0, 12 [ and let Bob’s stor-
age be given by F : B(Hin) → B(Hout). Then Protocol
1 is an [n,λ(δ,d),ε(δ,d),1/(d + 1),d]-WSE protocol with
min-entropy rate
λ(δ,d) = − lim
n→∞
1
n
PFsucc[(log2(d + 1) − 1 − δ)n],
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and error ε(δ,d) = 2 exp[−f (δ,d)n] with
f (δ,d) := (δ/4)
2
32
{
log2[(d + 1)d] + log2 4δ
}2 > 0. (A7)
(ii) Suppose F = N⊗νn for a storage rate ν > 0, N
satisfying the strong-converse property and having capacity
CN bounded by
CN ν < log2(d + 1) − 1.
Let δ ∈]0, 12 − CN ν[. Then Protocol 1 is an
[n,˜λ(δ,d),ε(δ,d),1/(d + 1),d]-WSE protocol for sufficiently
large n, where
˜λ(δ,d) = νγN
(
log2(d + 1) − 1 − δ
ν
)
.
Note that when N = Id then CN = log2 d, so that the
bound in (A14) holds for a storage rate of
ν <
log2(d + 1) − 1
log2 d
≈ 1, for large d.
Thus for the case of bounded storage, security can in principle
be obtained for any storage rate ν < 1, provided we choose a
large enough system size d.
1. Security for honest Alice
Let us now consider the case of dishonest Bob. The main
difference from [13] in proving security is the use of the
uncertainty relation for the full set of d + 1 mutually unbiased
bases in prime power dimensions [17]. To see where we make
use of this relation, note that analogous to [13] we can model
Bob’s attack as a CPTP map E : B((Cd )⊗n) → B(Hin ⊗HK ).
Then, for any input state ρ ∈ (Cd )⊗n provided by Alice before
the waiting time, he obtains an output state ζQinK = E(ρ),
where Qin is the quantum information he puts into his quantum
storage and K is any additional classical information he
retains. Hence, the joint state of Alice and Bob before his
storage noise is applied is of the form
ρXn	nKQin =
1
dn(d + 1)n
∑
xn,θn,k
PK|Xn=xn,	n=θn (k)
× |xn〉〈xn| ⊗ |θn〉〈θn|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Alice
⊗ |k〉〈k| ⊗ ζxnθnk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob
, (A8)
where ζxnθnk is the state on Hin depending on Alice’s choice
of string xn, bases θn and Bob’s classical information k. Bob’s
storage then undergoes noise described by F : B(Hin) →
B(Hout), and the state evolves to ρXn	nKF(Qin). After time t
Bob also receives the basis info 	n = θn. Then their joint
state is
ρXn	nKF(Qin) =
1
dn(d + 1)n
∑
xn,θn,k
PK|Xn=xn,	n=θn (k)
× |xn〉〈xn|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Alice
⊗ |θn〉〈θn| ⊗ F(ζxnθnk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob B ′
, (A9)
where Bob now holds B ′ = 	nKF(Qin).
Our goal is to show that for any cheating strategy of dishon-
est Bob, his min-entropy about the string Xn = (X1, . . . ,Xn)
is large, using an entropic uncertainty relation. Recall that the
set of (d + 1) MUBs inCd satisfies [17] (see [32] for a simple
proof):
1
d + 1
d+1∑
i=1
H (Bi |ρ)  log2(d + 1) − 1, ∀ ρ ∈ Cd , (A10)
where
H (Bi |ρ) = −
∑
x
Tr
(∣∣bxi 〉〈bxi ∣∣ρ) log2 Tr(∣∣bxi 〉〈bxi ∣∣ρ) (A11)
is the Shannon entropy of the probability distribution induced
by measuring the state ρ in the basis Bi . This lower bound,
along with the uncertainty relation for the smooth min-entropy
from [23, Theorem 4.22], gives
Hε/2∞ (Xn|	n)ρ 
(
log2(d + 1) − 1 −
δ
2
)
n (A12)
for any 0 < δ < 12 with
ε = 2 exp
(
− (δ/4)
2n
32
{
log2[(d + 1)d] + log2 4δ
}2
)
. (A13)
Finally, we make use of Lemma 2.2 in [13] that relates the
smooth min-entropy to the maximal decoding probability,
PFsucc, to get
Hε∞(X
n|	nKF(Qin))ρ
 − log2 PFsucc
{
n
[
log2(d + 1) − 1 −
δ
2
]
− log2
2
ε
}
 − log2 PFsucc
{
n[log2(d + 1) − 1] − n
δ
2
}
,
where the second inequality follows from the monotonicity of
PFsucc and the fact that log2 2ε <
δ
2n for 0 < δ <
1
2 . By definition
of the smooth min-entropy, this implies that there exists an
ideal state σXnB ′ such that
(1) σXnB ′ ≈ε ρXnB ′ ,
(2) 1
n
H∞(Xn|B ′)σ  − 1n log2 PFsucc[n log2(d + 1) − n −
δ
2n], which proves part (i) of Theorem 2.
In the special case where F is the tensor product channel
F = N⊗νn, and whereN satisfies the strong converse property
and CN ν < log2(d + 1) − 1, by following the same steps as
in [13] we obtain that there exists an ideal state σXnB ′ ε-close
to ρXnB ′ with a min-entropy
1
n
H∞(Xn|B ′)σ  νγN
( log2(d + 1) − 1 − δ2
ν
)
> 0, (A14)
where γN (·) is the strong converse parameter of the channel
N [15]. This proves part (ii) of Theorem 2.
2. Security for honest Bob
The proof of security when Alice is dishonest is essentially
analogous to [13] (see Sec. 3.4 and Figs. 7 and 8 of that work),
where we introduce an imaginary “simulator” with perfect
quantum memory to define the desired ideal state. Hence, we
merely state how to adapt the proof of [13]: here we naturally
obtain (p) in place of the uniform distribution τ2[n] in our
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simulation. Similarly, the subset I is not chosen uniformly at
random, but with probability
Pr(I) :=
(
1
d + 1
)|I| (
d
d + 1
)n−|I|
. (A15)
APPENDIX B: OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER FROM WEAK
STRING ERASURE
We now show how oblivious transfer can be obtained even
from the nonuniform variant of WSE. To formally state our
result, we begin with the definition of oblivious transfer from
[13].
Definition 2. An (
,ε)-fully randomized oblivious transfer
(FROT) scheme is a protocol between Alice and Bob satisfying
the following:
Correctness. If both parties are honest, then the ideal state
σS
0S


1CS


C
is defined such that
(1) The distribution over S
0, S
1, and C is uniform:
σS
0S


1C
= τ{0,1}
 ⊗ τ{0,1}
 ⊗ τ{0,1}.
(2) The real state ρS
0S
1CY
 created during the protocol is
ε-close to the ideal state:
ρS
0S


1CY

 ≈ε σS
0S
1CS
C , (B1)
where we identify A = (S
0,S
1) and B = (C,Y 
).
Security for Alice. If Alice is honest, then there exists an
ideal state σS
0S
1B ′C , where C is a random variable on {0,1},
such that
(1) Bob is ignorant about S
1−C :
σS
1−CS


CB
′C ≈ε τ{0,1}
 ⊗ σS
CB ′C.
(2) The real state ρS
0S
1B ′ created during the protocol is ε-
close to the ideal state:
ρS
0S


1B
′ ≈ε σS
0S
1B ′ .
Security for Bob. If Bob is honest, then there exists an
ideal state σA′S
0S
1C such that(1) Alice is ignorant about C:
σA′S
0S


1C
= σA′S
0S
1 ⊗ τ{0,1}.
(2) The real state ρA′CY
 created during the protocol is ε-
close to the ideal state:
ρA′CY
 ≈ε σA′CS
C ,
where we identify B = (C,Y 
).
In the main part of this text, we restricted ourselves to
considering a simplified protocol containing all the essential
ideas of the following protocol. The actual protocol is very
similar, but for technical reasons we work with m blocks of
β elements each, instead of sampling individual elements Xj .
Fortunately, the protocol we use for the case of nonuniform
WSE remains the same as in the case of WSE with a small
modification. Since p = 1/2, the expected number of dits Xj
that Bob will learn is of course no longer roughly n/2 as
in the original setting [13]. This requires the introduction of
a new parameter η such that with high probability Bob will
learn n/η of the string’s entries. We again require an encoding
of subsets as strings. Since our subsets will now be smaller,
we choose t such that 2t  ( m
m/η
)  2 · 2t and an injective
encoding Enc : {0,1}t → T , where T is the set of possible
subsets of size m/η. Note that this again means that not all
subsets can be encoded but at least half of them will.
Protocol 3: WSE-to-FROT. Set η := 2(d + 1). Integers n,β
are such that m := n/β is a multiple of η. Outputs are (s
0,s
1) ∈{0,1}
 × {0,1}
 to Alice and (c,y
) ∈ {0,1} × {0,1}
 to Bob.
(1) Alice and Bob. Execute [n,λ,ε,1/(d + 1),d]-WSE.
Alice gets a string xn ∈ {0,1, . . . ,d − 1}n, and Bob gets a set
I ⊂ [n] and a string s = xI . If |I| < n/η, then Bob simply
chooses Itr from all subsets of size |I| = n/η uniformly at
random. Otherwise, he randomly truncates I to Itr of size n/η
and deletes the corresponding values in s.
We arrange xn into a matrix z ∈Mm×β ({0,1, . . . ,d − 1}),
by zj,α := x(j−1)β+α for (j,α) ∈ [m] × [β].
(2) Bob. (a) Randomly chooses a string wt ∈R {0,1}t
corresponding to an encoding of a subset Enc(wt ) of [m] with
m/η elements. (b) Randomly partitions the n dits of xn into
m blocks of β dits each: He randomly chooses a permutation
π : [m] × [β] → [m] × [β] of the entries of z such that he
knows π (z)Enc(wt ) (that is, these dits are permutation of the dits
of s). Formally, π is uniform over permutations satisfying the
following condition: for all (j,α) ∈ [m] × [β] and (j ′,α′) :=
π (j,α), we have (j − 1)β + α ∈ I ⇔ j ′ ∈ Enc(wt ). (c) Bob
sends π to Alice.
(3) Alice and Bob. Execute interactive hashing with Bob’s
input equal to wt . They obtain wt0,wt1 ∈ {0,1}t with wt ∈{wt0,wt1}.
(4) Alice. Chooses r0,r1 ∈R R and sends them to Bob.
(5) Alice. Outputs(s
0,s
1) := {Ext[π (z)Enc(wt0),r0],Ext[π(z)Enc(wt1),r1]}.(6) Bob. Computes c, where wt = wtc, and π (z)Enc(wt ) from
s. He outputs (c,y
) := {c,Ext[π (z)Enc(wt ),rc]}.
Theorem 3 (Oblivious Transfer). For any ω  (d + 1) and
β  max{67,256ω2/λ2}, the protocol WSE-to-FROT imple-
ments an (
,43 · 2− λ
2
512ω2β
n + 2ε) FROT from one instance
of of [n,λ,ε,p,d]-WSE, where 
 := ((ω−1
ω
) λ4(d+1) − λ
2
512ω2β )
n − 12.
1. Security for Bob
We first show that the protocol is secure against a cheating
Alice. This can again be done following the steps of [13] taking
the nonuniformity into account. Formally, let ρ˜A′′CY
 denote the
joint state at the end of the protocol, where A′′ is the quantum
output of a malicious Alice and (C,Y 
) is the classical output
of an honest Bob. Following the same steps as in [13], we
can construct an ideal state σ˜A′′W
0 W
1 C = σ˜A′′W
0 W
1 ⊗ τ{0,1} that
satisfies ρ˜A′′CY
 = σ˜A′′CW
C = σ˜A′′CS
C .
It now again remains to be shown that Alice does not learn
anything about C, that is, σ˜A′′S
0S
1C = σ˜A′′S
0S
1 ⊗ τ{0,1}. From
the properties of nonuniform WSE, it follows that σA′ ˆXnI =
σA′ ˆXn ⊗ [1/(d + 1)]. Since Bob randomly truncates I to Itr
such that |Itr| = n/η, the truncated set is independent of A′.
Furthermore, although I is not distributed uniformly over 2[n],
we can show that the truncated set Itr is indeed distributed
uniformly over all subsets of size n/η. Intuitively this follows
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from the fact that the distribution of the set I depends only on
|I|, the number of elements in I. Formally, the probability of a
given truncated set Itr can be written in terms of the probability
p( ¯A) that |I|  n/η as follows:
p(Itr| ¯A) =
∑
I⊆[n]
|I|n/η
p(I| ¯A)( |I|
n/η
) p(|I|  n/η)
= 1
p( ¯A)
∑
I
p(I)( |I|
n/η
) , (B2)
independent of the choice of truncation. Here 1/( |I|
n/η
) is the
probability that we pick a particular Itr from the original I and
p(I| ¯A) is the conditional probability of a set I, given that Bob
obtains a sufficient number of indices. The last step is simply
an application of Bayes’s rule, p( ¯A)p(I| ¯A) = p( ¯A|I)p(I),
where p( ¯A|I) = 1 for the subsets I in the sum. Note that
if |I| < n/η, then Bob chooses a subset of the desired size
uniformly at random from all subsets of size |I| = n/η and
hence Pr(Itr) is always uniform. Hence, conditioned on any
fixed Wt = wt , the permutation  is uniform and independent
of A′. It follows that the string Wt is also uniform and
independent of A′ and . From the properties of interactive
hashing, we are guaranteed that C is uniform and independent
of Alice’s view afterward, and hence
σ˜A′′S
0S


1C
= σ˜A′′S
0S
1 ⊗ τ{0,1}.
2. Security for Alice
The security proof for the case that Bob is dishonest is
analogous to [13], this time employing [13, Lemma 2.5] with
a subset size of |S| = m/η.
3. Correctness
It remains to prove that if both parties are honest, then
honest Bob can indeed learn the desired SC . This requires us
to show that for our choice of η, Bob can learn sufficiently
many indices i ∈ [n].
Lemma 1 (Correctness). Protocol WSE-to-FROT satisfies
correctness with an error of
43 × 2− λ
2
512ω2β
n
.
First we show using the Hoeffding bound [27] that the
probability that a subset of [n] where each entry is chosen
with probability p = 1/(d + 1) has less than n/η elements
is at most exp(−2n/η2). Consider a sequence of indepen-
dent random variables {X1, . . . ,Xn}, which are bounded
as follows: Pr(Xi − E(Xi) ∈ [ai,bi]) = 1, ∀1 < i < n. Then,
Hoeffding’s inequality states that the sum S = X1 + · · · + Xn
satisfies
Pr[E(S) − S  t]  exp
(
− 2t
2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
. (B3)
In our context, Xi is the binary variable which takes on
the value 1 if the index i ∈ I and 0 otherwise. The sum S
is thus simply equal to |I|, the number of elements in the
index set I, which is a random subset of [n]. For the case of
d + 1 encodings, Pr(Xi = 1) = 1/(d + 1) and Pr(Xi = 0) =
d/(d + 1), so that the expectation value satisfies
E(S) = E(|I|) = n
d + 1 . (B4)
Furthermore, we can take ai = 0 and bi = 1 for all i. Applying
Hoeffding’s inequality to the sum S = |I| gives
Pr
(
n
d + 1 − |I| 
n
d + 1 −
n
η
)
 exp
(
− 2n
[
1
d + 1 −
1
η
]2)
. (B5)
Rearranging terms, we obtain the probability that a random set
I has less than n/η elements:
Pr
(
|I|  n
η
)
 exp
(
− 2n
[
1
d + 1 −
1
η
]2)
. (B6)
Since our work is mainly a proof of principle, we do not yet
care about optimality or efficiency. We simply pick a choice of
η that will satisfy this condition and set η = 2(d + 1). Thus,
the probability that a random subset of [n] has less than n/η
elements is at most exp(−2n/η2).
Let ξ := 2−n/η2 . We have to show that the state ρ˜S
0S
1CY
 at
the end of the protocol is close to the given ideal state σ˜S
0S
1CS
C .
As shown previously, the probability that a subset of [n] has
less than n/η elements is at most
exp(−2n/η2)  ξ. (B7)
Hence, the probability that Bob does not learn sufficiently
many indices when both parties are honest is at most ξ . Let A
be the event that |I|  n/η. It remains to show that the state
ρ˜S
0S


1CY

|A is close to the given ideal state σS
0S
1CS
C .
Note that the correctness condition of WSE ensures that
the state created by WSE is equal to ρXnIXI = σXnIXI , where
σXnI = τ{0,1,...,d−1}n ⊗ [1/(d + 1)]. Since I0 and I1 are
chosen independently of Xn, XI0 and XI1 have a min-entropy
of n/η each. Since 
  n/2η  n/η − 2 log2 1/ξ , it follows
from privacy amplification that S
C is independent and ξ -close
to uniform. Since dishonest Bob is only more powerful than
honest Bob, we furthermore have from the proof against
dishonest Bob that S
1−C is independent and uniform except
with an error of at most εˆ = 41 × 2− λ
2
512ω2β
n
, where we used the
fact that Bob is also honest during WSE (ε = 0). Finally, by
the same arguments showing security for Bob, we have that C
is uniform and independent of S
0 and S
1. Hence,
ρS
0S


1C|A ≈ξ+εˆ σS
0S
1C.
Since the extra condition on the permutation  implies that
Bob can indeed calculate (Z)Enc(W ) from XI , we have that
Y 
 = S
C . Using Pr[A]  1 − ξ , we get
ρS
0S


1CY

 ≈2ξ+εˆ σS
0S
1CS
C .
Finally, λ  1, β > 1 and ω  (d + 1) give us 1/η2 =
1/[4(d + 1)2] > λ2/(512ω2β). Adding up all errors and not-
ing that
2 × 2− 1η2 n  2 × 2− λ
2
512ω2β
n
gives our claim.
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